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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN IMPLIED CIVIL
ACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Both the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 19342 contain comprehensive sections designed to regulate
fraudulent practices in the issuance, sale, and exchange of securi
ties.3 Neither of these sections, however, expressly provide civil
remedies for an aggrieved plaintiff. Nevertheless, the courts have
implied a civil cause of action arising from a violation of these statu-
tory provisions.
4
This Comment will consider the question whether exemplary
damages may be recovered 5 in an implied civil action under these
statutes. In considering this question it shall be assumed that a
valid cause of action, allowing compensatory damages, has been es-
tablished. This Comment will compare the two securities acts in
light of their express provisions, and the judicial interpretations
which have been given to them. Emphasis will be placed on the
recent decisions of Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.6 and de
Haas v. Empire Petroleum Inc.,7 cases which discussed the issue
of punitive damages in implied civil actions under the acts. Con-
sideration will also be given to the policy factors involved in the
awarding of punitive damages, and whether these factors may be
validly applied to the area of securities regulation.
Before any discussion is undertaken concerning the award of
punitive damages under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964) [hereinafter referred to as the Securi-
ties Act and the 1933 Act].
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1964) [hereinafter referred to as the Ex-
change Act and the 1934 Act].
3. The Securities Act's antifraud provision is contained in § 17(a),
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964). The Exchange Act's provision is found in
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964) and is interpreted by Rule 1OB-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969). See notes 14, 22, 23 infra, for text of these
provisions.
4. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946) (the leading case holding that an implied civil action arises for a
violation of the securities acts). See also, Note, Implying Causes of Ac-
tions from Federal Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963).
5. For a general discussion of the measure of compensatory dam-
ages recoverable in an implied civil action, see Note, Measurement of
Damages in Private Actions under Rule 10b-5, WASH. L.Q. 164 (1968).
6. 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
7. 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969).
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Exchange Act of 1934, it is necessary to consider the background
and general scope of these statutes.
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME OF SECURITIES REGULATION
The Securities Act of 1933 is designed primarily to regulate the
procedures involved in the public issuance of securities.8 Those
securities which are offered through the mails or through channels
of interstate commerce are within the purview of the statute.9
Basically the Securities Act establishes requirements for dis-
closures which must be followed by the issuer. These require-
ments fundamentally include a registration statement filed by
the issuer with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 10 . This
statement must contain certain information concerning the forth-
coming issue of securities." The Act also requires that a prospec-
tus containing the basic information in the registration statement
be made available to prospective buyers of the security to be is-
sued.12 The failure to honestly represent the material facts in
either the registration statement or the prospectus renders the
issuer open to both civil and criminal liability.'3 The Act also con-
tains a general anti-fraud section, section 17(a), 14 which will be
discussed later in conjunction with the Exchange Act of 1934.
The Exchange Act of 1934 deals with a wide range of subjects,
but primarily it is geared to the regulation of the transfer of se-
curities.
Whereas the 1933 Act is concerned primarily with the dis-
tribution process, the 1934 Act has to do with post distribu-
8. 1 L. Loss, SECURiTiES REGULATION 130 (2d ed. 1961).
9. Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1964). The Securities and Exchange Commission
is hereinafter also referred to in the text as S.E.C.
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964) and 17 C.F.R. § 230.401-417 (1969).
12. 1 L. Loss, supra note 8. See also 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1964).
13. The criminal penalties for willful violations of the Securities Act
are a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for 5 years, or both. 15
U.S.C. § 77x (1964).
14. Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964), provides:
(a) it shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any
securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the
mails, directly or indirectly -
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact necessary in order to make the
statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
the purchaser.
tion trading. It has four basic purposes: to afford a
measure of disclosure to people who buy and sell securities;
to prevent and afford remedies for fraud in securities trad-
ing and manipulation of the markets; to regulate the securi-
ties markets; and to control the amount of the Nation's
credit which goes into these markets. 15
The Exchange Act basically requires that all national securities
exchanges be registered with the S.E.C. unless specifically ex-
empted. 16 Other elements of the Act are: power of the S.E.C. to
expel exchange members for violations of the Act;' 7 power of the
S.E.C. to require certain trading procedures and practices to be
maintained by the exchanges;' s and a requirement of registration
with both the exchanges and the S.E.C. which is substantially
similar to the statement required by the 1933 Act.'9 The Exchange
Act also regulates the solicitation of proxies of securities listed and
registered on the exchanges. 20 In addition, there are provisions
which regulate over-the-counter brokers and dealers in securities.
21
As with the 1933 Act, the Exchange Act has a general anti-
fraud provision, section 10(b).22 This section, together with its
administrative companion regulation, 23 serves as the basis for an
implied civil action under the 1934 Act.
An important distinction which might be drawn between these
two acts concerns the nature of their general anti-fraud provi-
sions. While section 17(a) of the Securities Act is concerned with
fraudulent practices perpetrated by the seller upon the purchaser,
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is not so limited and embraces
15. 1 L. Loss, supra note 8, at 130-31.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1964).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(3) (1964).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(4) (b) (1964).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1964).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1964).
22. Exchange Act § 10 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange
or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
23. Rule 1OB-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969), which implements § 10
(b) of the Exchange Act, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
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fraudulent practices by either the buyer or the seller.24 This dis-
tinction becomes highly relevant when consideration is given to
the question of whether these acts should support a recovery of
exemplary damages in an implied civil action.
Another significant distinction which may be made between
these two acts concerns the contrasting savings clauses contained
in each statute.2 6 The clause contained in the Exchange Act, sec-
tion 28(a), has been construed by the courts as limiting the plain-
tiff in an implied civil suit brought under the act to "actual"
damages, thus precluding the possibility of exemplary damages.s
7
Courts have interpreted these two acts as constituting a single
comprehensive scheme of regulation. 28 The statutes have been con-
sidered in part materia in their operation and application.2 9 It has
been stated that the two statutes are, ". . . as closely related as two
nominally separate statutes could be." 30 Moreover, there is a pro-
vision in the Exchange Act" which provides that a willful viola-
tion of the 1933 Act constitutes an automatic breach of the 1934
Act.3 2 The interrelation between these Acts is of great significance
24. There have been various interpretations given for the differing na-
ture of these sections, all centered on the presumed congressional intent
present at the time of the legislative enactment. See discussion at notes
80-87 and accompanying text infra.
25. This is a basic issue present in both Globus v. Law Research
Service Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), and de Haas v. Empire Petro-
leum, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969). The distinction is relevant
because common justice would appear to dictate that similar fraudulent
conduct whether engaged in by the seller or buyer should result in identi-
cal legal liabilities.
26. The savings clause of the Securities Act, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p
(1964), states, "The rights and remedies provided by this subchapter shall
be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at
law or in equity." Exchange Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a), and its
savings clause, provides in part that, ". . . no person permitted to maintain
a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover. . . a
total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act com-
plained of."
27. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968); Meisel
v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
28. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilligan Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 775
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 62 (N.D. Ohio
1964); United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1953);
Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
29. Brown v. Gilligan Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 775 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
30. 6 L. Loss, supra note 8 at 3915.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1964).
32. This provision deals with the revocation of the registration of
any broker or dealer, if after an appropriate hearing the Commission deter-
mines that the revocation is in the public interest and has made a deter-
mination that the broker or dealer ". . . (D) has willfully violated any
when consideration is given to the question of whether punitive
damages should be allowed under these statutes. For example, it
may be possible for a single fraudulent practice to be simultane-
ously prescribed by both acts3 3 in which case the statutes should be
construed as allowing similar remedies.
4
Having examined the applicable fraud provisions and their
interrelationship, the consideration now is whether exemplary
damages may be recovered in an implied civil action under one
or both of these statutes.
III. THE TRADITIONAL DICHOTOMY
Whether exemplary damages are available in an implied action
under either section 10(b) or section 17(a) has been a continuing
legal problem. In deciding the question the courts have tradition-
ally drawn a distinction between the 1934 Act and its 1933 predeces-
sor. This distinction has been based primarily on the presence of
section 28(a) in the Exchange Act.3 5
Mills v. Sarjem Corp.3 3 was among the earliest cases to consider
whether an implied section 10(b), Rule 10B-5 action would support
an award of punitive damages. Mills involved an action brought
by former stockholders who alleged that the corporation which
purchased their interests did so through fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions violative of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.3 7 The plaintiffs
sought exemplary damages.
The Mills court dismissed the count seeking exemplary
damages, by ruling that section 28(a) precluded all but "actual"
damages. 38 The court did not elaborate, but rather held that an
implied civil action brought under section 10(b) and Rule 10B-5
of the Exchange Act would be limited to the recovery of "actual"
damages.
The question of exemplary damages arose also in Green v.
provision of the Securities Act of 1933, or of this chapter, or of any rule or
regulation thereunder." Id.
33. An example of such a situation occurred in Globus v. Law Re-
search Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), where the fraudulent
conduct constituted a violation of both securities acts.
34. "Allowing exemplary damages under the 1933 but not the 1934
Act would create an unreasoned split between buyers and sellers of se-
curities subjected to fraud of an equally heinous nature." Globus v. Law
Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969). For a further dis-
cussion of the parity of remedies allowed under each act, see notes 35-54
and accompanying text infra.
35. See note 26 supra. Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-hh (1964), has been interpreted as precluding all but compensa-
tory damages in an action brought under that statute. The Securities Act
has no comparable limitation and has been interpreted as allowing ex-
emplary damages. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968).
36. 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
37. Id. at 759.
38. Id. at 770.
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Wolf Corp.3 9 As was the case in Mills, the court was specifically
called upon to rule whether 10(b) and Rule 1OB-5 would support
exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals considered that the
policy factors underlying an award of punitive damages, 40 coupled
with the presence of section 28(a), disallowed the award of any-
thing in excess of actual damages.
41
In dictum the Green court stated that, "... punitive damages
are permitted under the Securities Act of 1933, but that Act does
not contain language similar to section 28(a) of the 1934 Act.1
42
In attempting to rationalize this inconsistency between the two
statutes, the court continued:
Congress might well have intended to impose different lia-
bilities under each of the two Acts since at the time of its
enactment the requirements of the 1934 Act could have
been avoided if the corporation simply refused to register
on the exchanges. The provisions of the 1933 Act were less
easily evaded. Hence, lighter penalties under the 1934 Act
would have been an inducement for corporations to comply
with its terms. ... 43
This view as to section 10(b) and Rule 1OB-5 of the 1934 Act has
been followed by several other courts.
44
In Myzel v. Fields45 the Court of Appeals again considered the
effect of section 28(a) of the 1934 Act. There the court stated,
"... we feel the only effect of this provision is to prohibit punitive
damages, which might otherwise be available in some states in civil
actions under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. '4 6 Here again
the court interpreted section 28(a) as precluding exemplary
damages in an implied civil action.
In an action brought solely under the 1933 Act most courts
traditionally would not deny the recovery of punitive damages.
47
In Nagel v. Prescott & Company48 the purchasers of stock sued
39. 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3493 (1969).
40. For a discussion of these factors which appear in the Globus v.
Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), see notes 84-93
and accompanying text infra.
41. 406 F.2d at 302.
42. Id. at 303.
43. Id.
44. Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co.,
216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
45. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 88 Sup. Ct. 1043 (1968).
46. 386 F.2d at 748.
47. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corporation, 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3493 (1969); Nagel v. Prescott & Company,
36 F.R.D. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
48. 36 F.R.D. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
under the 1933 Act's fraud provisions alleging that the securities
were sold under the fraudulent misrepresentation that they would
produce an imminent windfall. The Nagel court concluded that,
"although there is no provision in the Securities Act authorizing
recovery of punitive damages, it is clear that the plaintiffs may re-
cover upon a proper showing of maliciously improper conduct."
49
The Nagel court reached this conclusion by viewing the savings
clause of the 1933 Act 50 as preserving for the plaintiff all other
rights and remedies he may have enjoyed under state law.51 The
court viewed the case within the framework of local Ohio law and
concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to exemplary damages.
The key fact which lead the Nagel court to rule that punitive
damages might be recoverable was the showing of the requisite
scienter by the plaintiff. "Recovery of exemplary damages hinges
upon the plaintiff's ability to prove that the defendants were mo-
tivated by actual malice in allegedly misrepresenting the invest-
ment picture to the plaintiff.
'52
The courts, then, have consistently drawn a distinction between
the quality of damages available under either act. The distinction
drawn basically stems from the interpretation given to the respec-
tive savings caluses. 53 The distinction is unfortunate because it
fosters the existence of an unbalanced arsenal of remedies favoring
the purchaser. Since the remedies under the 1933 Act apply
solely to purchasers, the allowance of punitive damages under the
1933 Act gives the purchaser an added remedy not available to the
seller under the 1934 Act. In effect the same fraudulent conduct
by either the purchaser or the seller would result in differing legal
consequences. 4
IV. THE EMERGING ALTERNATIVES
A. Punitive Damages Recoverable Under Both Acts
There appear to be two distinct and divergent views as to the
recovery of punitive damages which are emerging from the recent
cases. These cases share the common goal of attempting to alleviate
the inconsistency which has arisen in an implied civil action under
section 10 (b) or Rule 1OB-5 of the 1934 Act and section 17 (a) of the
1933 Act.
The first view is exemplified by de Haas v. Empire Petroleum
49. Id. at 449.
50. Securities Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1964).
51. 36 F.R.D. at 449.
52. Id.
53. The courts have interpreted § 16 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7 7p (1964), as broad enough to allow exemplary damages. For the
actual text of the respective savings clauses, see note 26 supra.
54. Globus v. Law Research Services, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir.




Inc."5 In this case a District Court was faced with the question of
whether punitive damages could be available to a plaintiff in an
implied civil action under Rule 1OB-5 of the 1934 Act. The court
also considered the effect of section 28(a) of that statute.
The court, in ruling that section 28(a) does not restrict the
type of damages recoverable, concluded that punitive damages could
be awarded in an action under Rule 10B-5: "We interpret this limi-
tation as applying only to claims for relief which are expressly or
impliedly created by the Act itself."56 The de Haas court, in arriv-
ing at its decision placed great emphasis on the special nature of an
implied civil action derived from Rule 10B-5. It held that such an
action was based primarily on general tort law principles and con-
sequently could not be considered as being created by the Act it-
self.5
7
The de Haas court cited Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.68 as
being the leading case on the question of whether a civil action lies
for a violation of Rule 1OB-5. Kardon held that regardless of the
absence of express statutory authorization, a civil action will arise
in favor of the wronged party based on the general tort principle
that the doing of an act prohibited by statute may give rise to an
actionable wrong.59
That a plaintiff may bring a civil action based upon a violation
of 10(b) or Rule 1OB-5 apparently is well settled.60 Implicit in
the cases permitting such civil actions is the rationale stated by the
Kardon court.61 Hence it is seen that the de Haas case relied on
the independent nature of the civil cause of action, namely its de-
rivation from a source other than the 1934 Act, in granting punitive
damages.
In its interpretation of section 28(a) the de Haas court relied
strongly on Hecht v. Harris, Uphan & Co.6 2 The Hecht case in-
volved alleged violations of both statutes. The court, however, was
55. 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969).
56. Id. at 649.
57. Id.
58. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
59. Id. at 513. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: §§ 286-288c
(1965) (wherein the concept of a violation of a statute will give rise to an
actionable wrong).
60. For a full discussion of all the cases see Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 649
(1954) (wherein the editors conclude that although the United States Su-
preme Court has yet to decide whether an implied civil remedy is available
to a plaintiff under Rule 10B-5, the lower federal judiciary have unani-
mously upheld such an action).
61. See note 60 supra.
62. 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Calif. 1968).
called upon to specifically decide the effect of section 28 (a) on the
recoverability of punitive damages in an implied civil action under
Rule 1OB-5. The court stated:
We are inclined to view that the restrictive provisions of
Section 28(a) . . . concerning "actual damages" were in-
tended by the Congress to apply to those statutory causes
of action which it specifically "permitted" in the Acts-but
not to other rights of action based upon the general law of
tortious injury and that exemplary damages could be
awarded in the pending action. 68
In Baumel v. Rosen 64 the court gave a similar interpretation
to section 28(a). There the court stated, ". . . Sec. 28(a), by its
terms, appears to be applicable only to suits specifically authorized
by the 1934 Act. .. ."65 In a civil action not specifically authorized
by the 1934 Act, the Baumel court would most probably hold sec-
tion 28 (a) inapplicable, thus opening the possibility of exemplary
damages.
The above decisions, then, have attempted to eliminate the
disparity between the 1934 Act and its 1933 predecessor by allow-
ing exemplary damages under the former statute. This result is
accomplished by construing the implied action under Rule 1OB-5
as not within the limitation of section 28(a) of the 1934 Act.
B. Complete Disallowance of Punitive Damages
In the recent decision of Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.6 6
the Second Circuit has responded to the disparity in the damages
recoverable in an implied civil action brought under both securities
acts by holding that neither act will support a recovery of exem-
plary damages."'
In Globus the court was faced with the precise question of
whether section 17(a) of the 1933 Act could support an award of
punitive damages. The case involved an action by purchasers of
the stock of Law Research Services, Inc. (LRS), against LRS and
the underwriter of the public offer. The plaintiffs alleged viola-
tions of various sections of both the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts,
including section 17 (a) of the 1933 statute,68 in addition to a count
based on common law fraud.
At trial the jury decided in favor of the defendants as to the
63. Id. at 445. See also, Stevens v. Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836
(E.D. Va. 1968).
64. 283 F. Supp. 128 (D. Md. 1968) (this case involved a pure Rule
1OB-5 action).
65. Id. at 145. The court was not considering the issue of whether
exemplary damages should be allowed, but rather was considering the
proper measure of compensatory damages.
66. 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
67. Id. at 1286; see Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968),
where this court also held that a Rule 1OB-5 implied civil action will not
support a recovery of exemplary damages.
68. 418 F.2d at 1278.
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common law fraud count, but also decided that the defendants
were in violation of both securities acts.6 9 The trial judge ruled
that punitive damages were properly available in an implied action
under section 17(a).70 The defendant appealed. The Circuit Court
held that it was error to allow punitive damages under section
17(a),71 reversing the lower court on this issue. The court reasoned
that Congress most probably intended section 17 (a) to serve as the
basis for a criminal or injunctive action.72 It recognized that all
the express civil remedies under the Act limit themselves to com-
pensatory damages.7 3 It also stated that notwithstanding the con-
troversy which still surrounds the recoverability of civil compensa-
tory damages under section 17(a), a recovery of punitive damages
would most surely "jolt and startle" the draftsmen of the 1933 Act.
74
Underlying the seminal question of whether punitive damages
should be available in an implied 17(a) action were the funda-
mental questions of the general propriety of exemplary damages
in this type of action and the advisability of the court perpetuating
the disparity between the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The Globus court
ruled in the negative as to both points.
Globus, then, represents a position opposite to that taken by
the court in de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Inc. 75 However, both
cases share the common ground of attempting to eliminate the
disparity between the two acts. Where their views radically clash
is in the recognition and value given to the policy factors underly-
ing the issue of whether exemplary damages should be awarded
in implied civil actions.
Finally it must be emphasized that the Globus court expressly
declined to rule on the question of whether punitive damages were
recoverable in a common law fraud action which is joined in an
action based on a violation of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
76
69. Id. at 1279.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1286.
72. Id. See also 3 L. Loss, supra note 8 at 1784-85 (1961); Douglas,
The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 181-2 (1933); Note,
Federal Regulation of Securities: Some Problems of Civil Liability, 48
HARv. L. REv. 107 (1934).
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 771(2) (1964).
74. 418 F.2d at 1284.
75. 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969).
76. "Because the jury found the defendants not liable on the common
law fraud count, we also do not reach the question of whether § 28(a)
would prohibit punitive damages in an action for common law fraud ......
418 F.2d 1276, 1286 n.11. The basic distinction between a fraud action at
common law and one brought under the Securities Act was stated by the
V. POLICY FACTORS N GLOBUS
The lower court in the Globus case held in favor of retaining
the distinction between the two acts, thus allowing punitive
damages under section 17(a) of the 1933 act."7 The court reasoned
that the disparity between the two acts, namely the presence of
section 28(a) in the 1934 Act, was part of the general statutory
scheme intended by Congress.78 The court stated that,
[s]ince the 1934 Exchange Act was to apply only to post-
distribution trading of securities listed on the national ex-
changes, issuers could avoid its provisions, at least as far
as new issues were concerned, simply by not listing them
with the national exchanges.
79
The possibility of easy avoidance, the court reasoned, prompted
Congress to expressly limit the remedies available to the plaintiff.
The device was a form of lure by which the Congress attempted to
expand the applicability of the 1934 Act.80
The lower court in Globus also concluded that the policy fac-
tors underlying the awarding of punitive damages were present in
the instant case. First, the lower court stated that the award of
punitive damages has been a useful tool in deterring fraudulent
conduct of a "heineous character." The court stated that Congress
had expressly declared war upon dealers in securities who would
deceive investors, and to this end equipped the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Department of Justice, and the in-
vesting public, with an arsenal of legal weapons designed to instill
honesty and fair dealing among issuers, underwriters, and others
who deal in securities.
8 '
The court also thought that punitive damages would be ap-
propriate in the circumstances where the amount recoverable in
actual damages might be small and of insufficient quantity to
render the plaintiff completely whole. 2 Moreover, in certain cir-
trial court in Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). For a plaintiff to maintain successful common law fraud
action it is necessary for him to
establish (1) justifiable reliance, necessary in a common
law deceit action, rather than the federal securities law fraud's ac-
tual reliance test, i.e., that the plaintiff would have been influenced
to act differently than he did if the defendant had disclosed the
omitted fact; and (2) a specific "intent to defraud" as distinguished
from actual knowledge of a statement's material falsity or of facts
showing it to be false or misleading, notwithstanding the existence
of a general fraudulent purpose aimed at the public as a whole,
or wanton and reckless conduct evidencing a deliberate disregard
for one's own obligations or the interest of others.
rd. at 195.
77. 287 F. Supp. at 196.
78. Id. at 193-94.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 194.
81. Id. at 194-95.
82. The court stated:
In addition to deterring fraud generally in the sale of securi-
ties, punitive damages serve the desirable function, certainly in
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cumstances it would be entirely unjust to limit a recovery to
compensatory damages. Unscrupulous dealers may actually con-
sider the amount of their possible liability in compensatory damages
as a "cost" of illicit business.
8 3
The Circuit Court countered these arguments most effectively
when it considered the entire battery of remedies available to the
plaintiff under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act.8 4 The appellate
court noted the fact that the 1933 Act not only provides for stiff
fines and criminal penalties for violation of section 17(a),8 5 but
also authorizes the S.E.C. to suspend or expel from the trading
exchanges those who violate the securities laws. Recognition was
given to the fact that, notwithstanding the elimination of punitive
damages as a remedy, large substantial recoveries of compensatory
damages might still be available to the plaintiff.8 6 The awarding
of punitive damages, then, was considered by the appellate court
to have but a mere marginal deterrent effect.
8 7
The court also thought that any potential for deterrence should
be weighed against the possible adverse consequences of awarding
this type of recovery.88 One such consequence concerns the im-
possibility of the court reasonably limiting the amount of punitive
damages a jury might award.8 9 The court analogized this situation
cases involving limited amounts of compensatory damages (such
as that here) of insuring that victims of a scheme to defraud who
purchased only a small number of shares pursuant to a Regulation
A offering . . . so that they will not find themselves without an
effective legal remedy.
Id. at 195.
83. Id. See also Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497,
223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961), where the court declared that limiting the judg-
ment to compensatory damages
would require the offender to do no more than return the money
which he has taken from the plaintiff. In the calculation of his ex-
pected profits, the wrongdoer is likely to allow for a certain
amount of money which will have to be returned to those victims
who object too vigorously, and he will be perfectly content to
bear the additional cost of litigation as the price for continuing his
illicit business.
Id. at 492, 179 N.E.2d at 499.
84. 418 F.2d 1276, 1284 (2d Cir. 1969).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964) (wherein a 5 year prison term is provided).
86. 418 F.2d at 1285. See also Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d
Cir. 1968). Consideration should be given to the possibility of bringing a
class action by virtue of FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
87. 418 F.2d at 1285.
88. Id.
89. The court stated that normally punitive damages were available
in actions by a single injured party thus keeping the damages to a reason-
able level. The court stated, "A single misstatement in a prospectus or
offering circular . . . may make those liable to literally thousands of pur-
chasers." Id.
to the factual situation in Roginski v. Richardson Merrell Inc.90
In Roginski the court denied punitive damages in a class action
against a drug company which was negligent in the marketing of a
harmful drug. Roginski also emphasized the principle that puni-
tive damages should be limited to a reasonable award in an action
brought by an individual.91
Thus Globus, in an attempt to eliminate the apparent dichot-
omy present in the remedies available under the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
has recognized as a desirable policy the equalization of the remedies
available under both Acts: 92 "Allowing exemplary damages under
the 1933, but not the 1934 Act would create an unreasonable split
between buyers and sellers of securities subjected to fraud of an
equally heineous nature."93
VI. A COMPARISON OF DE HAAS AND GLOBUS
As illustrated by both de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Inc.9 4
and Globus v. Law Research Services, Inc.,95 the courts have rec-
ognized and attempted to eliminate the disparity present be-
tween the two securities acts in the area of implied civil remedies.
Naturally, factual distinctions may be drawn between these
two decisions. De Haas involved an action brought solely under
section 10(b) and Rule 1OB-5 of the 1934 Act, while Globus in-
volved a compound section 10(b), Rule 10B-5 and section 17(a) ac-
tion. Notwithstanding their differing remedial bases, these cases
share the common ground of considering the issue of whether an
implied civil action brought under securities acts will support the
recovery of exemplary damages. Basically, then, a comparison of
the relative merit of these decisions must rest upon the general
propriety of exemplary damages in an implied action under the
Acts.
In considering whether the recovery of punitive damages is
proper in an implied civil action, analogous cases offer only limited
assistance. Although there are cases in which the court has not
hesitated to allow the recovery of punitive damages in actions
implied by the provisions of specific statutes,96 other cases have
90. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
91. See note 89 supra.
92. 418 F.2d 1276, 1286 (2d Cir. 1969).
93. Id.
94. 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969).
95. 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
96. See, e.g., Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1967)
(punitive damages recoverable in an action under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) ); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 76, 84-88 (3d Cir.
1965) (punitive damages recoverable under Civil Rights Act of 1871,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) ); In re Den Norshe Amerikanlinje A/S, 276 F. Supp.
163, 176 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (punitive damages recoverable in an action under
the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964) ); Wills v. Trans American Air Lines,
200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (punitive damages recoverable in an
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reached a contrary result.
9 7
The courts in both the United Mine Workers v. Patton9s and
the Burris v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters9 9 used the
rationale that punitive damages should not be allowed in an implied
civil action brought under the statute absent express congressional
mandate. °0 0 As stated in Patton,
. . . When Congress has intended that damages in excess
of the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff may be
recovered in an action created by statute, it has found no
difficulty in using language appropriate to that end.101
Since there is no "express congressional intent" in an implied civil
action, the above view would not consider punitive damages avail-
able.
The appellate court's decision in Globus seems to offer a more
concrete approach to the question of the availability of punitive
damages. The court considered the role that punitive damages
might play in the scheme of regulation established for the specific
enforcement of the 1933 Act.'0 2 At the inception of the 1933 Act
most commentators and members of the S.E.C. thought section
17(a) would serve only as the basis for criminal or injunctive ac-
tions.103 Civil liability was presumed limited to the express pro-
visions of sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act. Sections 11 and 12,
which create express civil remedies, limit recoveries to compensa-
tory damages.
04
Considering the probable intent of the Congress in passing
section 17(a) and the subsequent judicial interpretations which
have been given to this section, the court stated,
[s]ince even in this day of easily implied liability under
the securities acts, it is not settled to everyone's satisfaction
that compensatory damages are authorized by Sec. 17(a),
it would no doubt jolt and startle the draftsmen of the 1933
action under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 404b, 902(a), 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1374(b), 1472(a) (1964) ).
97. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 824 (1954) (involving an action brought under
a federal labor statute); Burris v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963) (action based upon violation of the
Labor-Management Disclosure Act of 1959).
98. 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 824 (1954).
99. 224 F.Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
100. 211 F.2d 742, 750 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 824 (1954);
224 F. Supp. 277, 280 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
101. 211 F.2d at 749.
102. 418 F.2d 1276, 1284 (2d Cir. 1969).
103. See authorities cited in note 72 supra.
104. These sections are concerned with misrepresentations appearing
in the perspective and the registration statement respectively.
Act to be told that they also authorized the recovery of
punitive damages when that section was formulated. 10
With this statement the court refused to adopt the interpretation
given to section 17(a) by the lower court.106 The court then
weighed the factor of whether the recovery of punitive damages
was necessary for the effective enforcement of the Act and con-
cluded that the policy factors indicated a negative answer.
107
The de Haas court approached the dichotomy from an entirely
different frame of reference. Relying solely upon an interpretation
of section 28(a) of the 1934 Act, which limited the sections' appli-
cation to actions "expressly authorized by the Act," the court ap-
plied a traditional tort approach. 08 The violation of the statute
was considered by the court to imply the civil remedy. 0 9 Be-
cause the court was faced with an "implied" remedy, section 28(a)
was deemed inapplicable, thus creating the legal foothold necessary
to support the award of exemplary damages.
The de Haas court apparently ignored the strong policy fac-
tors present against the imposition of exemplary damages which
played a large role in the Globus decision. 10 The court in de Haas
relied entirely on the theoretical legal basis mentioned above."'
It is submitted that the Globus case which relied heavily on prac-
tical considerations and the policy factors involved, should predomi-
nate as the better view.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that, in an implied civil action under either the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act of 1934, the recovery of
punitive damages should not be allowed. The primary reason that
punitive damages are imposed is to punish the wrongdoer. This
punishment is theoretically designed to further the policy of deter-
ring the undesirable conduct. As has been previously noted,
1"'
there are harsh penalties expressly provided by the securities acts.
These penalties whether they constitute criminal sanctions, in-
junctive action, or civil liabilities, serve as an effective deterrent to
fraudulent practices. The further imposition of punitive damages
can have but a marginal effect on increasing this deterrent, while
creating a situation where unreasonably excessive recoveries might
be fostered. Finally, considering the policy factors involved,"83
105. 418 F.2d 1276, 1284 (2d Cir. 1969).
106. Id. at 1286.
107. Id.
108. The court adopted a view consistent with that stated in RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 286-288c (1965). See note 60 supra.
109. 302 F. Supp. 647, 650 (D. Colo. 1969).
110. The court considered the pure legal question of whether a viola-
tion of this particular statute would create a civil remedy.
111. See note 110 supra.
112. See text and accompanying notes 10-27 supra.
113. See text and accompanying notes 77-93 supra.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
and the apparent regulatory scheme expressly adopted by Con-
gress, 114 the recovery of punitive damages seems unwarranted. 115
DAVID B. RAND
114. See text and accoinpanying notes 105-07 supra.
115. During the publication stages of this Comment, the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc.,
38 U.S.L.W. 3320 (1970).
